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We present stochastic forecasts of the Social Security trust fund by modeling key 
demographic and economic variables as historical time series, and using the fitted models 
to generate computer simulations of future fund performance. We evaluate several plans 
for achieving long-term solvency by raising the normal retirement age (NRA), increasing 
taxes, or investing some portion of the fund in the stock market.  
 
Stochastic population trajectories by age and sex are generated using the Lee-Carter and 
Lee- Tuljapurkar mortality and fertility models. Interest rates, wage growth and equities 
returns are modeled as vector autoregressive processes. With the exception of mortality, 
central tendencies are constrained to the Intermediate assumptions of the 2002 Trustees 
Report. Combining population forecasts with forecasted per-capita tax and benefit 
profiles by age and sex, we obtain inflows to and outflows from the fund over time, 
resulting in stochastic fund trajectories and distributions. 
 
Under current legislation, we estimate the chance of insolvency by 2038 to be 50%, 
although the expected fund balance stays positive until 2041. An immediate 2% increase 
in the payroll tax rate from 12.4% to 14.4% sustains a positive expected fund balance 
until 2078, with a 50% chance of solvency through 2064. Investing 60% of the fund in 
the S&P 500 by 2015 keeps the expected fund balance positive until 2060, with a 50% 
chance of solvency through 2042. An increase in the NRA to age 69 by 2024 keeps the 
expected fund balance positive until 2047, with a 50% chance of solvency through 2041. 
A combination of raising the payroll tax to 13.4%, increasing the NRA to 69 by 2024, 
and investing 25% of the fund in equities by 2015 keeps the expected fund balance 
positive past 2101 with a 50% chance of solvency through 2077. 
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 Introduction
The federal government has four principle tools for extending the life of the social security (Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance, or OASDI) trust fund.  It must either raise
taxes, cut benefits, increase fund returns by investing in equities, or pay for any shortfalls out of
general revenue or bond sales.  Exactly who pays for social security reform and when depends
on which of these options are exercised.  Unfortunately, decisions about which options to enact
are clouded by uncertainty about future economic and demographic outcomes and the inherent
complexity of the system.  Crucial to this endeavor, then, is a concise set of fund forecasts that
clearly explain the consequences of any given policy.
Given assumptions about future demographic and economic conditions, forecasting the growth
of the fund and the effects of policy changes is largely a matter of bookkeeping.  Such forecasts
are precise, but inaccurate due to uncertainty in such assumptions.  By gauging this uncertainty
on the basis of historical variation and incorporating it into our estimates explicitly, we construct
probabilistic forecasts that are imprecise but accurate.  For a given policy scenario, for example,
we estimate the probability of insolvency for any given horizon, rather than estimating a single
date of insolvency.  This moves beyond the traditional approach of calculating “high”,
“medium”, and “low” forecasts
Background
At the end of 2001, the combined OASDI fund held a total of $1.213 trillion in the form of
government securities. Annual expenditures for the calendar year 2001 totaled $439 billion, but
income including interest totaled $602 billion, so the fund balance increased $163 billion from
the end of 2000.
According to intermediate forecasts from the actuaries of the Social Security Administration
(SSA), such fund increases will continue until about 2020, at which point the balance of the fund
will top out at nearly $3.8 trillion in 2002 dollars.  Thereafter, the benefits paid to newly retiring
baby boomers will exceed the total income received in taxes, and the fund will be depleted by
2041.
Keeping tax rates fixed, an older population has a harder time supporting its retirees, since it has
fewer workers and hence less tax revenue per retiree.  Our society is inexorably aging as
mortality falls and fertility remains relatively low.  Figure 2 shows a 100-year forecast of the old-
age dependency ratio, defined as the number of persons aged 65 and over divided by the number
of persons aged 20 to 64. The middle line is the median forecast, and the outer lines show a 95%
confidence interval. The ratio is projected to increase on average well beyond the retirement of
the baby boomers.  The sheer demographics necessitate substantial and permanent changes in the
system.
Structure of social security
The OASDI account balance at the end of this year is equal to the balance at the end of last year
plus annual tax income and interest, minus benefit payments, railroad retirement, and2
administrative expenses (see Figure 3.)  Taxes increase or decrease year-to-year depending on
the rate of real wage growth during the year, and benefits shift up or down according to past real
wage growth, since benefits depend on past earnings.  The total amount of interest earned on the
fund obviously depends on the interest rate earned on the collection of special U.S. Treasury
bonds purchased by the Social Security Administration, mostly in earlier years..
We estimate total taxes into the system in any given year by multiplying per-capita age- and sex-
specific tax profiles by age- and sex-specific population estimates, and summing across sexes
and ages. Likewise, benefits are estimated with a set of per-capita age- and sex-specific benefit
schedules and population estimates for that year.  (These tax and benefit schedules are shown in
Figure 1 for the starting year, 2001.)  Given such schedules and population estimates on a year-
to-year basis, in addition to the interest rate, administrative expenses and railroad retirement (the
last two being relatively small in size), forecasting the balance year-to-year is a straightforward
exercise in accounting.  The difficulty is mostly in estimating the future inputs.
Uncertainty in forecasts
There are four rough categories of uncertainty in the accounting system described above.  First,
demographic uncertainty has been well recognized. We treat fertility and mortality as stochastic,
while setting immigration rates at levels assumed by the SSA actuaries. Economic uncertainty
also intrudes. We treat real interest rates and the growth of real wages as stochastic; these reflect
the volatility of inflation as well. When modeling equities investment, we also model rates of
return on the stock market stochastically.
Another significant source of uncertainty is the behavior of future workers and retirees.  If the
age at normal retirement were raised an additional year, would workers work an extra year, or
would they continue to take early retirement?  It is also impossible to know exactly what labor
force participation rates may be at other ages, or to what extent women will continue their
advance into the labor force.
Fourth, there is a broad range of structural economic changes that could intervene in
unpredictable ways.  Examples include major technological innovations, the globalization of
trade and capital, feedback to or from other economic/demographic variables, or some other
dynamic interaction with demographic or behavioral forces.
We attempt to gauge demographic and economic uncertainty through the use of fitted time series
models.  Long time series data exist on mortality and fertility by age, along with economic series
such as the rate of real wage growth, interest rates, and stock market returns.  The size of the
historical variation in these series, as estimated by the variances of the innovation terms in our
models, provides a measure of uncertainty about the future behavior of the series.  By repeatedly
simulating future trajectories of these time series models with independent pseudorandom
innovations, we can generate an entire distribution of fund balance trajectories over time, along
with cost rates, income rates, and actuarial balances.
The last two categories of uncertainty are more difficult to model stochastically.  Instead, we
treat the behavior of retirees by allowing for the deterministic adjustment of various parameters
in our model, such as hazard rates of retirement by age, in order to assess the impact of different3
modes of behavior.  Immigrants are also added in deterministically.  We do not consider any
economic/demographic interactions, feedback, or dramatic structural economic changes.
Options for extending solvency
The first policy option we consider is an increase in the payroll tax.  Presently legislated at
12.4%, we construct a set of four incremental increases in the tax level up to 14.4%.  We always
assume these increases occur immediately, and proportionately across sexes and ages.
1
Next, we treat the issue of benefit cuts in the form of upward adjustments in the normal
retirement age (NRA).  This is the age at which workers become eligible to receive full benefits,
set at 65 under current legislation.  Workers can also opt to retire as early as 62, the Early
Retirement Age (ERA), but the benefits are reduced; or, they can wait until as long as age 70,
receiving increased benefits.  Most persons retire early at age 62, and of those remaining, most
retire at 65.  That is to say, the hazard rate for retirement peaks dramatically at ages 62 and 65,
and there is some low “background” rate of retirement at all other ages.
Presently, the NRA is scheduled to increase by two months of age per year for six years. This
started in 2000 (raising it to 66 by 2005), and shifts again starting in 2017 (raising it to 67 by
2022).
2  We consider a number of alternative, accelerated schedules of NRA increases, raising
the final NRA to various values from 67 to 69 at various rates of change over time.   For all of
these schedules, the ERA remains at 62, but penalties for early retirement increase accordingly
since they depend on exactly how many months of age prior to the NRA retirement is taken.  We
do not assume that individuals will continue working for the extra years imposed, so taxes do not
necessarily increase at ages where the NRA is shifted up.  Thus, by age at retirement we really
mean the age at which benefits are started. We assume that the peak in the retirement hazard at
62 remains, but that the peak in retirement at the NRA shifts upward according to the given
schedule of shifts.
Third, we consider a set of plans to invest some portion of the fund in equities.  The SSA’s
intermediate scenario assumes bonds will yield a 3% real return annually in the future, compared
with historical returns of about 7% for broad equities indices such as the Standard & Poor 500
(S&P500).  Arguments have been made in favor of investing a substantial proportion of the fund
balance to the stock market.  Investment could be implemented either through the control of an
independent board of trustees, or through the creation of individual retirement accounts
controlled by earners themselves.  Detractors of such schemes argue that the risk implied by
short-term fluctuations in the stock market may outweigh potential gains.  Others argue that the
creation of a politically isolated investment program is unrealistic.  Here we simply report the
probability distributions for outcomes.
We assume a small portion of the trust fund is invested in equities at an initial date of 2005, and
the invested proportion of the fund is increased linearly over time until 2015, when a ceiling is
reached.  For example, 1% of the fund would be invested in equities starting in the year 2005,
and this proportion would be linearly increased over a period of 10 years, to be fixed at some
proportion thereafter.  As a proxy for stock market returns, we use the S&P500, for which a long
historical time series exists.  Since interest rates and equities returns have been correlated
historically, we model them jointly in vector autoregressive form.  Average market returns are4
constrained around a mean of 7% in the long run, and interest rates are constrained to 3% on
average.
Finally, there is the potential to combine these three options in some form.  We treat such
possibilities by considering a three-dimensional “policy space”.  This can be constructed by
translating each of the above options into scalar form (e.g. the tax rate, the proportion of the fund
invested in the long run, and the number of years added to the NRA), and scaling a set of
perpendicular axes accordingly.  We then evaluate a common criterion at a set of evenly spaced
points throughout the space (e.g. the probability of insolvency by some horizon), we interpolate
to estimate the full response surface, and we find isoquants on these surfaces.
Evaluation of outcomes
For a system as complicated as the trust fund, there are numerous criteria used for actuarial
assessment.  Cost rates and income rates provide annual measures of flows into and out of the
fund.  The cost rate for a year is defined as total yearly expenditures (including all benefits,
administrative expenses, and railroad retirement) divided by the taxable payroll (total combined
taxable wages and self-employment income).  The cost rate was about 11% in 2001 and is
projected to rise to 20% by 2075 according to the SSA intermediate scenario.  The yearly income
rate is total tax income (including taxes on benefits) for the year divided by the taxable payroll.
This was about 12.7% in 2201, and is projected to increase to about 13.4% by 2075.
The summarized cost rate for horizon T is the present value of total expenditures through T,
divided by the present value of total taxable payroll through T.  The SSA projects a summarized
cost rate of 15.59% for the horizon 2002-2076 using the intermediate assumptions.
Similarly, the summarized income rate is the present value of all taxes collected through T,
divided by the present value of total taxable payroll through T.  To evaluate the long term
balance through T, one first adds the beginning fund balance into the summarized income rate,
defined as the adjusted summarized income rate.  This is projected to be 13.72% for 2002-2076.
The summarized actuarial balance for horizon T is the difference between the adjusted
summarized income rate and the summarized cost rate, equal to 13.72% - 15.59% = -1.87% for
horizon T = 2076.  That the balance is negative implies a long-term imbalance.  This percentage
is equal to the payroll tax increase that would be required to maintain a positive balance through
2076, raising the rate from 12.4% to 14.27% starting in 2002.  Multiplying the summarized
actuarial balance times the present value of total taxable payroll through 2076 yields about $4
trillion, which is the immediate cash infusion which would keep the system solvent through 2076
under SSA’s intermediate scenario.
The Stochastic Model
Other stochastic models for OASDI include a simple model by Sze (1995), and a relatively
complex model by Holmer (1995; now known as the EBRI model).  In comparison, our model
includes detailed stochastic projection of demographic change.  Our analytic structure provides a
transparent way of incorporating changes (e.g., in policy or behavioral assumptions), is explicitly
designed to include multivariate stochastic processes (e.g., of economic variables), and provides
a clearly defined strategy for evaluating multiple measures of risk.5
We employ a demographic-economic model of the OASDI system.  Tuljapurkar and Lee (2000),
in an IUSSP volume on intergenerational transfers, set out the modeling framework and some of
its dynamic properties.  Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998a) describe the evolution of the model to
include a detailed analysis of benefit and retirement profiles.  Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998b)
summarizes recent findings that incorporate simplified models of some economic variables. See
also Lee and Tuljapurkar (2000).
Our model is an analytically specified, dynamic, stochastic recursion (Lee and Tuljapurkar,
1994; Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1997; Lee and Tuljapurker, 1998a.  The starting point for the model
is a detailed stochastic model of demographic change based on Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998a).
Figure 4 shows forecasts of the median total population over time, together with 67% and 95%
confidence intervals. With the exception of mortality, our demographic and economic forecasts
are scaled to match the SSA’s 2002 intermediate assumptions on average in the long run.
3  Thus,
in the long run, the total fertility rate is constrained to 1.95 on average, annual growth in real
wages is constrained to 1.1%, and the real effective interest rate is constrained to 3.0%. Mortality
is estimated using the Lee-Carter model (see below).  Real returns on equities are constrained to
7% on average.  Immigration estimates are deterministic, consisting of the same intermediate
age- and sex-specific forecasts used by the SSA.
We calibrate the model by running it with deterministic assumptions that are nearly identical to
the SSA’s intermediate forecasted demographic and economic assumptions.  We find that our
model in this case tracks fairly closely the cost and income rates for the OASDI fund over the
same 75 year projection period.  The only output-based component of the model that we
explicitly adjust to match the SSA’s forecasts is the disability cost rate; all other sources of
income and expenditure are simply observed to confirm that there is general agreement with the
SSA forecast.  We have also carried out validation studies of model components (e.g., mortality
forecasts, Tuljapurkar and Boe, 1998a; ex-post validation of population projections by
Tuljapurkar and Boe, 1998b and Lee and Miller, 2001).
Model Outputs
For any given set of policy assumptions, say a particular scenario of change in the NRA, the
outputs of the model are generated as a large set (typically 1000) of alternative future trajectories
generated by repeated stochastic simulations.  Now consider any outcome of interest, say the
trust fund balance in the year 2026.  The trajectories of the model will yield a set of possible
values for that year, and the probability distribution of those values will be the probabilistic
forecast.  We may compute consistent statistical descriptors (probabilities, averages, standard
deviations, and so on) for any desired outcome from the set of model trajectories.  It is important
to note that in our model the probability distribution of trajectories always yields a consistent
probability distribution of outcomes involving ratios, sums of ratios, and so on.  This kind of
consistency is not automatic with scenarios.
Next, we consider the OASDI trust fund balance over time, starting with the known balance at
the end of calendar year 2001, and forecasting over a 100-year horizon. The “baseline”
assumptions we use are those of the current legislation: The payroll tax rate is held constant at
12.4%, the NRA is raised to 66 and 67 starting in 2000 and 2017 respectively, and there is no6
investment in equities. Under these assumptions, our model generates a set of 1,000 random trust
fund trajectories, of which ten are plotted in Figure 5.  Each trajectory is unique, as it results
from a unique set of input trajectories (mortality, fertility, real wage growth, interest rates), so
trajectories can reach exhaustion on different dates.  Figure 6 shows the median fund balance
with a 67% confidence interval (meaning that 67% of the trajectories at any given point in time
fell within this range).  The dotted line shows the average (or expected) fund balance at each
point in time. This trajectory differs noticeably from the median balance trajectory since the
distribution of fund balances at a given point in time is typically asymmetrical.
Next, we observe the first date at which each fund reaches exhaustion for each trajectory.  A
histogram of these dates, displayed in Figure 7,  indicates the probability distribution, or the
relative odds, that exhaustion will occur in any range of years.  The median year of insolvency is
2038, several years short SSA’s intermediate estimate; our interpretation is that there is a 50%
chance the fund will last beyond the end of 2037.  There is a 1.9% chance that the fund will
reach exhaustion by 2026, and an 85% chance that it will reach exhaustion by 2052.  There is
only a 1.1% chance that the future will be so favorable such that the fund will stay solvent
through 2101.  (The last bin at 2101 includes trajectories that remained positive throughout the
100-year simulation, horizon and which may remain positive indefinitely.)
Figure 8 is a histogram of summarized actuarial balances for a 75-year horizon, through 2076.
The median balance is -2.55%, somewhat more pessimistic than the SSA intermediate forecast (-
1.87%).  This is due in part to the somewhat higher life expectancies predicted by the Lee-Carter
model of mortality.  Our estimated 95% confidence interval for the 75-year actuarial balance is -
6.40% to 0.08%, comparable the SSA’s high-cost/low-cost range of -5% to 0.44%.
Figure 18 shows the quantiles of the distribution in the Trust Fund Ratio (the assets at the
beginning of the year as a percentage of the outgo during the year) over the 75-year period
through to 2076.  The peak in the median of the TFR occurs in 2015, coinciding with SSA's
medium-cost Trust Fund Ratio peak.
Evaluation of policy alternatives
Table 1 shows results for many of the simulations described below.
Tax increases
We started with four sets of additive payroll tax increases implemented immediately in 2002,
raising the rate from 12.4% to 13.4%, 14.4% and 14.9%.  Figure 9 shows histograms of the dates
of exhaustion for each of these scenarios, with the baseline distribution at the top, and Figure 10
shows histograms of the actuarial balances.  With a tax increase of  1%, the median date of
insolvency is 2048 (compared with 2038 for no tax increase), and the chance of insolvency by
2052 falls to 57% (compared with 85%).  At a tax rate of 14.4%, the life of the fund is extended
roughly another twenty years, with a median date of insolvency at 2065, and the chance of
insolvency by 2052 falls to 26%.  When the tax rate is increased to 14.9%, the median fund lasts
for just about 75 years (so the chance of insolvency by 2076 is about half), and the chance of
insolvency by 2052 is only 14%.7
NRA changes
Next, we set the tax rate to the legislated 12.4%, and implemented four sets of accelerated NRA
shifts in two stages.
4  Presently, the NRA is scheduled to increase by two months of age per year
for six years, starting in 2000 (raising it to 66 by 2005), and again starting in 2017 (raising it to
67 by 2022).  Using the same six year phase-in period, we first construct a set of four accelerated
NRA schedules.  These raise the NRA:
1) to 66 by 2005, and again to 67 by 2011;
2) to 66 by 2005, to 67 by 2012, and to 68 by 2023;
3) to 66 by 2005, to 67 by 2012, and to 68 by 2017;
4) to 66 by 2005, to 67 by 2012, to 68 by 2017, and to 69 by 2023.
Figure 11 shows a histogram of the dates of exhaustion for each scenario, and Figure 12 shows
the distributions of the 75-year summarized actuarial balances.  The effect of the first accelerated
NRA shift is quite minimal.  The median year of insolvency is unchanged, and the median
actuarial balance is only shifted from -2.55% to -2.45%.  Increasing the NRA an additional year
to 68 by 2023 has a slightly more dramatic effect.  The expected fund balance remains positive
until 2045, and the chance of insolvency by 2041 is 50%, or 23% by 2052.  The median 75-year
actuarial balance rises to -2.07%, an improvement of nearly half a percent over the presently
legislated result.  Accelerating the change to age 68 by six years in time, however, has almost no
effect, as the median of insolvency is not budged, and the median actuarial balance only
improves to -1.97%.  When the NRA is raised to 69, the expected fund balance remains positive
until 2047, and the chance of solvency is 50% through 2042, while the median 75-year actuarial
balance is -1.6%, still well-short of long-term solvency.
Equities investment
Next, we fixed the NRA changes and tax rate as currently legislated, and experimented with
investment in equities.  In each scenario, we invest 1% of the total fund balance in the S&P500
starting in 2005.  We then linearly increase this percentage to some fraction (e.g. 15%) over a
period of 10 years, after which the proportion of the fund is the market is set to this fraction
indefinitely.
5   We used values of 15%, 30% 45% and 60% for this long-run investment fraction.
After 2015, the proportion of the fund is readjusted at the end of each year to keep the fraction
invested constant.
Figure 13 shows the histograms of dates of exhaustion for the four scenarios, with the baseline
scenario (no investment) at the top.  A 15% level of equities investment has a very minor impact
on the fund, allowing for only one additional year to either the median year of exhaustion, or
solvency of the expected fund balance.  Increasing the fraction to 30% adds one more year to the
median year of exhaustion (2040), but the expected fund balance now remains positive until
2046.  Increasing investment to 45% again only adds two more years to the median year of
exhaustion (2042), but now the expected balance stays positive until 2051.  Finally, the highest
level of investment, at 60%, only extends the median year of exhaustion one more year to 2043,
but the expected fund balance remains positive until 2060.
The significant divergence between the average and median fund balances indicates that equities
investment drastically increases the asymmetry of fund balances. This distributional asymmetry8
is demonstrative of the approximate lognormality of fund balances at certain points in time.
Stock prices (as well as population stocks) can be approximated by multiplicative processes with
normally distributed growth rates.  As a result, the distribution of a stock price (and similarly the
fund balance) at a given point in time can have a very long right tail.  The outcome is that the
average balance can be substantially positive even when the median balance is negative and the
median year of insolvency has long passed.
Of course, this occurs to some extent without any investment in equities (population growth and
bond returns generate the same lognormality), but the effect is magnified with investment.
Increasing the level of fund investment to an unrealistic level, such as a 90% investment in
equities by 2005, creates an even more drastically skewed distribution of fund balances.  In that
scenario, the median year of insolvency is only extended to 2052, but the average fund balance
stays positive indefinitely!  Of course, such an extremely high upper tail implies economically
unrealistic levels of growth. Our model is not equipped to deal with such drastic distortions, but
at moderate levels of investment this effect may be more realistic.  Note that modeling the fund
deterministically ignores this effect completely because one assumes constant positive returns.
The distributional behavior of the fund balances under increasing investment demonstrates
another interesting prediction.  Detractors of investment point to the increased riskiness of
equities investment.  Note that in Figure 13, the left side of the distribution of years of
insolvency shifts very little.  This is to say that even the worst-case investment returns imply no
more risk than the worst-case bond returns.
Of course, bonds can also lose money in real terms; the question is whether the potential gain
(7% over 3.0% on average) offsets the increased variability.  According to our estimates, it
usually does.  In either the 45% or the 60% investment scenario, there is only an 18% chance that
the fund balance will be lower in 2040 than if no equities investment had taken place.  At the
60% level, there is only a 13.1% chance that insolvency will come at an earlier date because of
investment.  At the 45% investment level, there is only an 11.4% chance that insolvency will
come at an earlier date.
Combined policy changes
Considered separately, the above methods for achieving solvency require substantial changes to
extend the median life of the trust fund more than a few years.  Tax increases and large benefits
cuts are both highly unpopular, and investment alone does not provide a big enough boost.
Another alternative would be a combination of some form.
We examine this question by exploring the overall “policy space” available to policymakers.
First, we construct three two-dimensional policy spaces, using each of the possible pairs of
combined methods: taxes and benefits, taxes and investment, and benefits and investment.  An
outcome of interest can then be plotted as the third dimension to create a “policy surface”.
Figure 14 shows the probability of fund solvency through 2051, as a function of NRA change
and investment level.  As described above, five NRA schedules were employed, each using six
years of time for each year of NRA adjustment.  The first is the legislated schedule (resulting in a
final NRA of 67 by 2022), the second is an accelerated shift to age 67 by 2012, and so on, with9
the most dramatic change incorporating an NRA of 69 by 2023.  The proportion of fund invested
is that fraction of the fund invested in the S&P500 after a 10-year phase-in, starting in 2001.
This is set at 15% increments from 0% to 60%, as in the section above.  The probability of
solvency through 2051 is only15% when no changes are legislated, and at the other extreme, the
probability increases to 54% when 60% of the fund is invested in equities by 2015, and the NRA
is shifted to age 69 by 2023.
Suppose one is interested in finding those combinations of NRA increase and equities investment
which result in equivalent outcomes, according to the risk measure for example. Figure 15 shows
combinations of NRA change and investment which give the same probability of solvency
through 2051, obtained by interpolating Figure 14.  Each line indicates combinations which yield
the same probability of solvency through 2051.  As described above, the most dramatic
improvement is achieved in the increase from an NRA of 67 to 69.
Figure 16 shows the probability of solvency until 2051 by 25 different combinations of NRA
change and tax increases.  The NRA shift schedules are the same as in Figure 14, and the tax
increases are in 0.5% steps up to 2% (for tax rates of 12.4%, 12.9%, 13.4%, 13.9%, and 14.4%).
Clearly, the move towards solvency is more dramatic when implemented through tax increases
as compared to NRA increases.  A 2% tax increases alone raises the likelihood of solvency to
74% for the next 50 years, but even the most dramatic NRA shift fails to raise the 50-year
probability of solvency above 30% if taxes are not changed.  A moderate combination of both
shifts, such as an NRA of 68 by 2017 and a 1% tax increase, results in a fairly substantial
improvement.  This combination raises the chance of solvency through 2051 to 58% and extends
the median year of insolvency out to 2056.
Figure 17 shows the chance of solvency until 2051 by various combinations of tax increases and
investment levels.  Again, tax increases pack a much more potent punch than investment at any
level.  An investment level of 30% combined with a 1% tax increase raises the chance of
solvency to 56%.
When all three policy options are employed, a substantial boost is gained from the synergistic
effect between investment and increasing external cash flows.  By incorporating a 1% tax
increase with 25% equities investment by 2015, and an NRA shift schedule resulting in a final
NRA of 69 by 2023, the median year of exhaustion is extended to 2077 while the expected fund
balance stays positive beyond 2101.  There is a 79% chance of maintaining solvency through
2051 under this plan, and there is a 38% chance that the fund would remain solvent through the
next century.
Conclusions
We consider three tools for achieving solvency, both separately and in combinations: Taxes,
NRA chances, and equities investment. Considered separately, fairly substantial changes are
required to extend the life of the OASDI trust fund with any certainty.  An immediate tax rate
increase to 14.9% would be required to extend the fund beyond 2077.  The NRA would have to
be raised to 69 by 2023 to postpone the median year of exhaustion by only 4 years.  Equities
investment alone, even at unrealistically aggressive levels, cannot postpone fund insolvency for
more than ten to fifteen years, at least according to the median fund balance (and the mean may10
be a misleading statistic in these scenarios).
However, combinations of adjustments can have more dramatic effects. A combined 1% tax
increase and NRA shift up to age 69 by 2023 would extend the median year of insolvency to
2062.  By incorporating a 25% level of investment in equities, the boost supplied by these
changes would be magnified, extending the median year of insolvency out to 2077.
Equities investment has both drawbacks and advantages.  The main drawback is that when not
supplemented with additional cash, the impact at any reasonable level of investment is minimal.
Also, there is non-negligible chance that some losses would occur.  When the proportion of the
fund in equities is increased to 45% by 2015, there is an 18% chance that the balance would be
lower in 2040 than would result from pure bond investment.
The advantage to equities investment is that it could compound income or savings obtained from
other changes in the system.  When combined with a moderate tax increase and/or NRA change,
the impact of investment is much more substantial. The cost of the higher returns associated with
equities investment is greater variability. However, the probability of insolvency never increases
when investment is undertaken, regardless of the horizon or investment level.11
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Appendix: Summary of the model
The U.S. Social Security system is of a PAYGO retirement system in which government collects
payroll tax revenues specifically for the OASDI (Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance)
program.  These funds are held in a Trust Fund whose assets are invested in special obligations
of the US Treasury at a legislated interest rate.  The Social Security Administration determines
benefit eligibility and benefit levels in accord with legislated rules, and pays benefits to
beneficiaries (retired and disabled workers and their eligible dependents and survivors.
The dynamics of the Trust Fund are described in terms of these variables.
Symbol Definition
t Time in years
a Age in years
s Sex (male or female)
B(t) Balance in the Trust Fund in year t in
Constant Dollars
r(t) Real Interest Rate in Year t
T(s,a,t) Per-capita taxes paid in year t into public
retirement and disability system, by age,
sex
H(s,a,t) Per-capita benefits received in year t from
public retirement and disability system, by
age, sex
A(t) Administrative cost of system as fraction of
benefits paid out
p(t) Rate of growth of real wages (i.e.,
productivity growth) in year t
I(t) Real interest earned in year t
T(t) Total taxes collected by system in year t
H(t) Total benefits paid out in year t
N(s,a,t) Number of individuals in year t by sex, age
K(t) Aggregate rate of taxation of retirement and
disability benefits
The dynamics of the system are summarized by the recursion equation
B(t+1) = B(t) + I(t) + · T(s,a,t) N(s,a,t)  -  · H(s,a,t) N(s,a,t) - A(t) H(t) + K(t) H(t)
The sums in this equation are taken over both age and sex.  Note that we are using age-sex-
specific schedules for taxes and benefits, and these need to be updated over time.
Our updating procedures are based on several sources.  First, we employ many of the
assumptions made by the Trustees of the Social Security Administration (SSA) , as described in15
the annual Trustees' Reports  to Congress, and also in the series of Actuarial Studies published
by the Actuaries of the SSA.  Second, we have independently evaluated and analyzed many of
these factors as part of our modeling efforts (Lee and Tuljapurkar 1998a, b, Tuljapurkar and Boe
1998a, b).  Third, we have explored many of the issues and alternatives discussed in the Report
of the Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods, published by the SSA in 1996.  Finally, we
have studied many aspects of existing analyses of factors that go into the dynamics of the system
(as discussed in the research literature, e.g., Steurle and Bakija 1994).  Below we present a rather
brief summary of our methods for updating the various components of the model.
Tax levels may change for several reasons: (a) productivity gains (at rate p(t) ) increase the level
of real wages;  (b) labor force participation rates and unemployment rates may change;  (c) there
may be changes in the legislated tax-rate for taxes paid into the system;  (d) there may be
changes in the income distribution such that the effective tax rate changes (e.g., in the US, there
is a sliding income cutoff for OASDI contributions, but income levels generally are rising so that
an increasing proportion of annual earned wages may exceed the cutoff level over time); (e) the
tax rate on benefits paid out may change over time due to increases in the rate as well as changes
in the proportion of individuals subject to such taxes.
We update the aggregate schedules T(s,a,t) by using a multiplier at all ages that reflects real
wage growth, a second multiplier that reflects changes in the tax rate for distributional and
legislative reasons, a third multiplier that reflects changes in unemployment relative to the base
year, and an age-sex dependent multiplier that accounts for changes in labor force participation
rates relative to the base year.  An aggregate multiplier is used to reflect the rising tax rate on
benefits that is expected over the coming decades.
Benefits may change for different reasons: (a) productivity changes affect retirement benefits
only by cohort, because after retirement a cohort receives no adjustments for changes in real
wages; thus the productivity multiplier for benefits is lagged to reflect the age at retirement;  (b)
the age pattern of receipt of both retirement and disability benefits is a key factor.  We adjust for
receipt of retirement benefits by updating the schedule of benefits received in the main
“retirement window” of ages 62 through 70. Age 62 is the earliest for receipt of benefits, by age
70 virtually all eligible persons are taking benefits.  In between these ages is the normal
retirement age (NRA), which is scheduled to increase from age 65 today to age 67 in the year
2022, in two phase-in periods.  The phase-in of a new NRA is implemented by changing the age-
pattern of the fraction of full benefits that can be received based on one's choice of a retirement
age (i.e., less than 100 percent for early ages, 100 percent at NRA, and over 100 percent for ages
over NRA).  The updating procedure hinges on assumptions about the distribution of ages at
retirement (i.e., ages at which the decision is made to take retirement benefits).  The SSA
assumptions, which are in agreement with other studies of age-specific retirement hazard rates,
are combined with the age-pattern of benefit fractions for the NRA of all years, to provide an
updating rule for the age-sex schedule of benefits paid between ages 62 and 70.  At ages over 70,
updating is used to factor in a compositional change in beneficiaries (as the fraction of widows
and female survivors increases with age); (c) disability benefits are updated using changes in
aggregate levels of insured coverage, changes in the prevalence rate of disability beneficiaries at
ages below NRA, and the increase in disability pay-outs when disabled beneficiaries have to wait
to reach an increased NRA before converting to regular retirement benefits.  These procedures16
are appropriately modified for different scenarios of NRA change.
Population by age and sex needs to be updated through time.  For this we employ a stochastic
projection model  which is an updated and extended version of that presented in Lee and
Tuljapurkar (1994).  Mortality and fertility changes are described by stochastic time-series
models.  Central death rates m(x,t) for age x at time t are described by a Lee-Carter system,
log[m(x,t)]  = a(x)  + b(x)  k(t),
k(t)  = k(t-1)  - z  + e(t),
where a, b, z are estimated statistically, as are the properties of the innovation e(t).  Fertility rates
f(x,t) are described similarly,
f(x,t) = a1(x)  + b1(x) k1(t),
k1(t)  =  c k1(t-1)  + d u1(t)  + e u2(t-1),
but with long-term fertility constrained to 1.95 in the long run. Immigration is set to the ultimate
“intermediate” series of immigration levels that are assumed by SSA.  Combining these in a
cohort component projection yields stochastic sample paths of time series of population numbers
by age and sex.
Economic forecasts are generated with constrained autoregressive models.  Let r(t) be the real
annual effective interest rate at time t, and let s(t) be the real annual year-to-year return on the
S&P 500.  We fit a constrained VAR(3) model to these two series, using data from 1940-2001.
Typically, one fits an unconstrained VAR model, which here takes the form:
r(t) = α1 r(t-1) + α2 r(t-2) + α3 r(t-3) + β1 s(t-1) + β2 s(t-2) + β3 s(t-3) + εr(t)
s(t) = φ1 r(t-1) + φ2 r(t-2) + φ3 r(t-3) + θ1 s(t-1) + θ2 s(t-2) + θ3 s(t-3) + εs(t).
Let g be the long run average interest rate (set at 3.0%), and let c be the long run average stock
return (set at 7%).  The constrained form of the model takes the form:
r(t) = α1 r(t-1) + α2 r(t-2) + α3 r(t-3) + β1 s(t-1) + β2 s(t-2) + β3 s(t-3) + εr(t)
+ g(1- α1 - α2 - α3) – c(1 - β1 - β2 - β3)
s(t) = φ1 r(t-1) + φ2 r(t-2) + φ3 r(t-3) + θ1 s(t-1) + θ2 s(t-2) + θ3 s(t-3) + εs(t).
- g(1- φ1 - φ2 - φ3) + c(1 - θ1 - θ2 - θ3)
The real wage growth rate is modeled as an AR(1) constrained to 1.1% in the long run.  We
model this series independently of interest rates and stock returns as historically, the correlation
between real wage growth and these two variables is quite small. Let w(t) be the percentage
growth in real wages at time t, and let h be the long-run constraint.  The model is:17
w(t) = h + ∆ (w(t-1) - g) + ,(t).
The program is launched from initial conditions at the end of the year 2001, and is calibrated to
the known tax and benefit levels from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security
Bulletin.  The population projection is run first and the projections are stored.  The updating
process for benefits, taxes and trust fund balance is done in 1-year steps over the forecast
horizon.
The program outputs include measures of stability in the trust fund, such as cost rates, income
rates, and actuarial balances, as a function of time.  Finally, we note that the program can be split
to provide separate estimates of the OASI and DI program, and may be modified to include the
effects of partial funding or partial privatization.
Endnotes
                                                          
1  This is a slightly unrealistic adjustment since our simulation begins in 2001, implying a
retroactive tax increase; however we were interested in matching tax rate increases to actuarial
balance estimates.
2  Specifically, these shifts apply starting with the cohort reaching age 62 in each year of shift.
Older cohorts are grandfathered into the old NRA.  Thus there is a lag in the effect of NRA
shifts, since the actual change in benefits payment does not occur until the younger cohort
actually reaches the old NRA.
3  Our forecasts are stochastic, meaning that we generate 1,000 trajectories for each scenario; an
individual trajectory may take on a wide range of values, but on average they are constrained in
the long run.  They are not necessarily constrained to these averages in the short run because
jump-off points (the initial values in the year before the forecasts are started) may differ from the
long run averages.
4  We have modified our methodology for implementing NRA changes in light of feedback
provided to us by the SSA's actuaries (primarily Steve Goss). Thus our results for these scenarios
appear slightly more pessimistic than the results of previous simulations.
5   More precisely, once the set fraction has been reached, the proportion of the fund balance in
equities is reset to this fraction at the beginning of each calendar year as long as there is a











F i n a l  N R A 6 7 6 86 96 7 6 76 7 6 7 6 9 6 9 6 7 6 9
Percentage of fund in equities 0 0 0 0 0 30% 60% 30% 0 30% 25%
Size of tax increase
10 0 0 0 1% 2% 0 0 0 1% 1% 1%
Average date of insolvency 2041 2045 2047 2054 2078 2046 2060 2062 2075 2076 2101+
2.5th percentile date of insolvency 2027 2029 2029 2032 2038 2027 2027 2030 2035 2032 2036
16.7th percentile date of insolvency 2032 2033 2034 2038 2046 2032 2033 2035 2043 2040 2048
Median date of insolvency 2038 2041 2042 2048 2065 2040 2043 2048 2062 2056 2077
83.3rd percentile date of insolvency 2050 2056 2063 2072 2101+ 2060 2085 2096 2101+ 2101+ 2101+
97.5th percentile date of insolvency 2079 2097 2101+ 2101+ 2101+ 2101+ 2101+ 2101+ 2101+ 2101+ 2101+
Probability of solvency through 2026 0.019 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.019 0.019 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000
Probability of solvency through 2051 0.850 0.771 0.703 0.569 0.261 0.750 0.640 0.563 0.335 0.436 0.209
Probability of solvency through 2076 0.972 0.935 0.891 0.854 0.639 0.897 0.803 0.780 0.662 0.708 0.488
Probability of solvency through 2101 0.989 0.978 0.949 0.932 0.788 0.939 0.859 0.844 0.787 0.809 0.621
2.5
th percentile 75-yr summ. act. bal. -6.40 -5.73 -4.93 -5.48 -4.47 N/A N/A N/A -3.93 N/A N/A
16.7
th percentile 75-yr summ. act. bal. -4.21 -3.67 -3.03 -3.33 -2.32 N/A N/A N/A -2.03 N/A N/A
Median 75-yr summarized actuarial bal. -2.55 -2.07 -1.60 -1.63 -0.62 N/A N/A N/A -0.59 N/A N/A
83.3rd percentile 75-yr summ. act. bal. -1.03 -0.65 -0.33 -0.08 0.93 N/A N/A N/A 0.68 N/A N/A
97.5th percentile 75-yr summ. act. bal. 0.08 0.42 0.69 1.05 2.08 N/A N/A N/A 1.71 N/A N/A
Avg. balance as a percent of GDP in 2026 20 23 24 32 44 24 29 29 36 38 42
Avg. balance as a percent of GDP in 2051 -28 -16 -9 3 38 -15 11 11 26 31 54
Avg. balance as a percent of GDP in 2076 -147 -120 -90 -83 -8 -124 -46 -42 -14 -13 62
Avg. balance as a percent of GDP in 2101 -412 -361 -282 -293 -138 -379 -161 -177 -127 -135 54
2.5th percentile bal. as a % of GDP, 2076 -452 -383 -314 -323 -223 -413 -403 -291 -200 -287 -163
16.7th percentile bal. as a % of GDP, 2076 -234 -205 -168 -169 -102 -234 -214 -143 -94 -145 -65
Median balance as a percent of GDP, 2076 -121 -101 -75 -73 -25 -115 -95 -55 -24 -49 2
83.3rd percentile bal. as a % of GDP, 2076 -52 -37 -16 -8 71 -37 22 29 52 84 166
97.5th percentile bal. as a % of GDP, 2076 5 51 88 149 326 195 853 344 269 524 647
1  Baseline (currently legislated) scenario: Payroll tax rate of 12.4%, NRA of 67 by 2022, and no investment in S&P 500.
2  NRA raised to 68 by 2023.
3  NRA raised to 69 by 2023.
4  30% of fund invested in S&P 500 by 2015.
5  60% of fund invested in S&P 500 by 2015.
6  NRA raised to 69 by 2023 combined with 30% of fund invested in S&P 500 by 2015.
7  NRA raised to 69 by 2023 combined with payroll tax rate of 13.4%
8  Payroll tax rate of 13.4% combined with 30% of fund invested in S&P 500 by 2015.
9  Combination of NRA increase to 69 by 2023, payroll tax rate of 13.4%, and 25% of fund invested in S&P 500 by 2015.






















































































Figure 2. Old age dependency ratio (65+ pop)/(20−64 pop)
2.5%tile
mean
















































































Year    2.5%tile    16.7%tile    50%tile    83.3%tile    97.5%tile
2051      286.5        331.1        382.1        438.0         486.9
2076      252.2        323.6        414.2        522.5         631.3





















































































































Figure 7. Probability distribution of date of insolvency
2.5%tile    50%tile  Mean   97.5%tile










2.5%tile  50%tile   95%tile
 −6.40     −2.55      0.08
SSA hi  SSA med   SSA lo
 −5.00     −1.87      0.44
Figure 8. Distribution of 75−year summarized actuarial balance































Figure 9. Distribution of dates of exhaustion, four levels of tax increase
+
Under current legislation




















with 1% tax increase (13.4%)





















with 2% tax increase (14.4%)









































s Figure 10. Distribution of actuarial balances, 4 tax increases
Under current legislation






















with 1% tax increase (13.4%)






















with 2% tax increase (14.4%)




































Figure 11. Dist. of dates of exhaustion, 5 schedules of NRA shift
+
Under current legislation















Final NRA of 67 by 2012















Final NRA of 68 by 2024















Final NRA of 68 by 2018





























Figure 12. Dist. of actuarial balances, 5 schedules of NRA shift
Under current legislation














Final NRA of 67 by 2012














Final NRA of 68 by 2024














Final NRA of 68 by 2018




























Figure 13. Dist. of dates of exhaustion, 5 levels of equities
+
No investment in S&P 500















15% of fund in S&P 500 by 2015















30% of fund in S&P 500 by 2015















45% of fund in S&P 500 by 2015














































Figure 14. Chance of solvency until 2051, by NRA change and investment level
67 by 2022











































































































Figure 16. Chance of solvency until 2051, by tax increase and NRA change
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